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Abstract
This paper uses the Jeffersonian Embargo enacted in 1807 to estimate the welfare costs
of autarky. I use an Armington trade model to compute the welfare losses using two
sufficient statistics: the share of expenditures on domestic goods and the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported goods. I use historical data from 1792 to
1807 to estimate the Armington elasticity, using import tariffs as instrument for relative
prices. The empirical findings suggest welfare losses of 2.83-8.14% of real income.
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1 Introduction
During the Napoleonic Wars, American ships were seized by the French and British navies,
violating the U.S. neutrality. To protect US ships, in December 1807 the Jefferson adminis-
tration enacted an Embargo. The Embargo, one of the rare cases of autarky in the history,
lasted until March 1809, when Jefferson decided to re-open the US ports. This paper exploits
such policy shock to estimate the welfare losses from autarky.
I first set up a two-country Armington (1969) trade model, where each country produces
a differentiated good that cannot be substituted by production in another country. I follow
Arkolakis et al. (2012) and show that the change in welfare following a shock can be computed
using only two sufficient statistics: the share of expenditures on domestic goods and the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods.
I estimate the Armington elasticity of substitution using historical data from 1792 to 1807
on imports, domestic production and prices. I instrument the relative price of imports with
ad-valorem tariffs. The empirical findings document a median elasticity of 3.64. I use this
elasticity and the observed change in the domestic trade share to compute the welfare cost of
the Embargo. The preferred specification suggests a welfare loss of 2.83-8.14% of real income,
a striking number given that the Embargo lasted only 14 months.
Few empirical works have studied the implications of autarky, such as Bernhofen and
Brown (2004), Irwin (2005) and Etkes and Zimring (2015). This paper provides an exact mea-
sure of the welfare losses from autarky, using a framework commonly employed by economists
to evaluate trade policies (see e.g. Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013)). Moreover, my
approach relies only on two sufficient statistics, thus reducing the impact of measurement
error on the estimates, which is a typical concern with historical data.
Lastly, to my knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate, for the early 19th century, the
Armington elasticity, a key parameter in international economics (see Broda and Weinstein
(2006) and Feenstra et al. (2018)). Therefore, my estimates could be used in other empirical
works that focus on the same historical period.
2 The Embargo
During the Napoleonic Wars, American ships were seized as contraband of war by the
British and French navies. In response to these violations of U.S. neutrality, in December
1807 US President Jefferson imposed a general Embargo. Since the Embargo was the direct
response of the US government to a policy carried out by the European countries, it can
be considered an exogenous shock to the US economy. The Embargo lasted until March
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Figure 1: US Trade, 1792-1808
Source: North (1960). Data are in millions of dollars.
1809, after mounting domestic opposition, and generated a 73% drop in exports and a 48%
reduction in imports, as shown in Figure 1.
3 The Armington Model
I set up a general equilibrium Armington (1969) model that will be used to calculate the
welfare costs of the Embargo. The model assumes that each country produces a differentiated
good that cannot be substituted by production in another country. This is consistent with
the evidence that, at the time of the Embargo, a large fraction of US imports consisted of
goods, such as tea, coffee, spices, and wine, that US firms could not produce, due to climate
and land constraints.
3.1 Environment
Two countries, US and Rest of the World, produce a differentiated good using labor, under
perfect competition. In each country a representative agent maximizes the following CES
utility function:
Uj =
[
αq
σ−1
σ
Uj + (1− α)q
σ−1
σ
Rj
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
s.to qUjpUj + qRjpRj ≤ wjLj
2
where qij is the quantity of country i’ s good consumed by country j, Lj is the population,
σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, and α > 0 is a
preference parameter. US total imports equal
XRU ≡ qRUpRU = α
σ
(
pRU
PU
)1−σ
EU , (2)
where PU is the price index:
PU =
[
ασ(pUU)
1−σ + (1− α)σ(pRU)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ (3)
and EU are total expenditures. To ship a good from i to j, producers incur in iceberg costs
τij ≥ 1, equal to 1 for j = i. Perfect competition implies that pij = τijwi.
3.2 Welfare changes
Equation (1) and the budget constraint imply that welfare equals real income:
WU =
wULU
PU
. (4)
Consider a shock to trade costs τˆij ≡
τ ′ij
τij
, for j 6= i. Following Arkolakis et al. (2012), the
change in welfare associated with such shock is:1
WˆU =
(
λˆUU
) 1
1−σ
, (5)
where λUU is the share of income spent for domestic goods:
λUU ≡
XUU
EU
. (6)
The advantage of using the Armington framework is that the welfare changes can be exactly
1The share of expenditures on domestic goods is: λUU =
(
pUU
PU
)1−σ
. In percentage changes it becomes
dln (λUU ) = (1− σ) [dln (pUU )− dln (PU )]. Setting the US wage as numeraire, and since dlnτUU = 0, it holds
that dlnpUU = 0. Given that dln (WU ) = −dln (PU ), we have dln (WU ) =
dln(λUU )
1−σ . Integrating, we obtain
equation (5).
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computed using only two sufficient statistics. λUU can be directly observed in the data, while
the elasticity of substitution σ needs to be estimated. The following section will carry out
the empirical estimation of σ and compute the welfare losses from the Embargo.
4 An empirical assessment of the Embargo
4.1 Methodology
To estimate the Armington elasticity, I rearrange the FOCs of the consumer as
qUU
qRU
=
(
α
1− α
)σ (
pUU
pRU
)
−σ
. (7)
Assuming that the model holds period by period, the above expression can be estimated in
logs as:
yt = β0 + β1xt + νt, (8)
where yt ≡ ln
(
qUU,t
qRU,t
)
, the log of the ratio between US domestic sales and imports at time t;
xt ≡ ln
(
pUU,t
pRU,t
)
, the log of the ratio between the price of the domestic and imported goods;
β0 = σln
(
α
1−α
)
, and vt is an econometric error. The elasticity of substitution is simply
σ = −βˆ1.
4.2 Data
Given the limits on the availability of data, the empirical analysis is carried out with yearly
data from 1792 to 1807.
Domestic sales. Total domestic sales are computed by subtracting total exports (North
(1960)) and re-exports (Irwin (2003)), from the GDP estimates in Weiss (1992). For robustness,
I use 3 alternative measures: i) starting from the Weiss’ estimate in 1793, I recover the
GDP series until 1807 using the Davis (2004) Production Index; ii) the GDP series from
Gallman (1966), converted into a 1792-1807 series using the Davis Index; iii) the GDP series
constructed in Johnston and Williamson (2011).
Imports. Data on aggregate yearly imports are from North (1960). I subtract the amount
of re-exports from Irwin (2003).
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Table 1: OLS regression
Log of rel. sales (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of rel. prices -2.483*** -2.084*** -2.141*** -2.119***
(0.677) (0.600) (0.627) (0.479)
Constant 1.882*** 1.845*** 1.176*** 2.102***
(0.042) (0.049) (0.049) (0.061)
Observations 16 16 16 16
R2 0.651 0.570 0.572 0.630
Sample period: 1792-1807. Column (1): GDP from Weiss; column (2): Weiss series adjusted by Davis index; column (3):
Gallman series adjusted by Davis index; column (4): Johnston and Williamson series. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Prices. The analysis uses weighted averages of the prices of domestic and imported com-
modities prevailing in Boston (Smith and Cole (1935)), given its economic importance in the
early 19th century.2
4.3 Results
Table 1 presents the results from an OLS estimation of (8). Domestic sales and imports were
deflated by the appropriate price index. The estimated elasticity is between 2.084 and 2.483,
significant at 1% level. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I follow Arkolakis et al. (2018)
and instrument the relative price of imports with the log of average import tariffs (Irwin
(2003)). Table 2 shows that the magnitude of the elasticity is larger, as expected, and is
between 3.31-3.96, significant at 1% level.3 The median estimate is 3.64, similar to Feenstra
et al. (2018), which estimate the Armington elasticity with recent US data.
4.4 The welfare losses from autarky
The last step is to compute λUU , the share of expenditures on domestic goods. I compute it
as:
λUU = 1−
IMPU
EU
, (9)
2Results are similar if I use prices in Philadelphia.
3 Results are similar if I add average freight rates as instrument (North (1960)).
5
Table 2: IV regression
Log of rel. sales (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of rel. prices -3.960*** -3.313*** -3.333*** -3.953**
(0.757) (0.758) (0.749) (1.347)
Constant 1.961*** 1.910*** 1.239*** 2.199***
(0.079) (0.076) (0.078) (0.070)
Observations 16 16 16 16
R2 0.421 0.372 0.394 0.158
Sample period: 1792-1807. Same specifications as in Table 1, but the dependent variable is instrumented with average log
tariffs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
where IMPU are total imports and EU is total spending (total production plus imports and
minus exports). To compute the welfare losses, I plug into equation (5) σˆ = 3.64 - the median
Armington elasticity; λUU = 0.83 - the share of expenditure on domestic goods before the
Embargo, in 1807; λ′US,US = 0.91 - the share in 1808.
4 Simple algebra delivers Wˆ = 0.964,
and thus welfare losses of 3.6% of real income. Allowing for trade imbalances and tariff
revenues, the losses are 4.3%.5 Lastly, I use the standard error in column (1) in Table 2 to
provide bounds on the welfare losses, which are between 2.83% and 8.14% of real income.
5 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper captures the short-run effects of moving to autarky.
The study has shown that the impact of the Embargo on US welfare was sizable. It must be
recognized that the Armington is a simplified model: the number of products is fixed and
hence there are no gains from trade due to product variety. Nevertheless, the advantage of
using a parsimonious framework is that only two sufficient statistics are needed to estimate
the welfare losses, an appealing feature since we lack detailed historical data for the early
19th century.
4This is not 1 because smuggling activities allowed some trade to persist during the Embargo.
5Replace EU = wULU + RU + TU into WˆU =
E′
U
/P ′
U
EU/PU
, so WˆU =
(
λˆUU
) 1
1−σ ˆADJU , with ˆADJU =
1+(R′U+T
′
U)/(w
′
U
L′
U)
1+(RU+TU )/(wULU )
= 0.99 from North (1960). See also Esposito (2019).
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